Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality
Volume 5

Issue 3

Article 3

December 1987

Cursed Is the Ground: Pesticide Regulation and Farmworkers
Dennis R. Dullinger

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawandinequality.org/
Recommended Citation
Dennis R. Dullinger, Cursed Is the Ground: Pesticide Regulation and Farmworkers, 5(3) LAW & INEQ. 453
(1987).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol5/iss3/3

Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

Cursed Is The Ground': Pesticide Regulation
And Farmworkers
Dennis R. Dullinger*
Locked in such a terrible cycle of poverty and despair, it is a
tribute to their strength and fortitude that they survive at all.
But they do survive, and while they do not prosper, our economy prospers as a result of their commitment to their work
and to the work ethic. The cost of our failure to meet their
needs is measured not only by their suffering;, it is measured
by the unrealized human resources, the talent and the creativity they could bring to2our national life if we opened channels
for their participation.
Introduction
From Malthus to the Club of Rome, doomsayers have regularly arisen and prophesied imminent world starvation. These
scholars were among the many who underestimated the ability of
the human race to manipulate its environment. Unforeseen, or
perhaps unbelieved, was the genius of twentieth century men and
women who created chemical and industrial marvels to revolutionize the agricultural industry. Freed from the limits of the land's
natural bounty, and released from the bondage of labor intensive
farming techniques of past generations, the new agrarians saw an
end to humanity's ancient feud with the soil. Through the use of
sophisticated chemicals and mechanical technology, a miracle of
abundance unfolded within the agricultural industry.
While all countries were promised the benefits of new agricultural knowledge, no country contributed or benefited more
from this chemical and technical revolution than the United
* J.D. 1988, University of Minnesota; B.S. (Agriculture) 1984, University of
Minnesota.
1. [C]ursed is the ground for thy sake;
in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life;
Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee;
and thou shalt eat the herb of the field;
In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread,
till thou return unto the ground ....
Genesis 3:17-19 (King James) (The Lord to Adam).
2. President's Comm. on Mental Health, Report of the Task Panel on Migrant
and Seasonal Farmworkers 1191, 1196 (1978).

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 5:453

States. Propelled by its vast resources and equipped with its innovative technology, United States farmworkers sculpted the landscape into a seasonal monument to the country's wealth and
abundance. With astonishing rapidity, the agriculture industry irrevocably entrenched itself in a system which made use of chemical toxins to multiply the nation's harvests, feed its growing
population and support its booming economy.
In the last two decades, however, society has started to question whether this newly found cornucopia was purchased at an untold price. Stung by such front-page tragedies as those
experienced by the Vietnam veterans sprayed with Agent Orange
and alarmed by such environmental tragedies as those produced by
DDT, the nation began to sense a new conflict pitting an individual's rights to health and life against the society's needs for chemical husbandry of its Elysian fields.
This article concerns a group of people, rarely front-page candidates, who are casualties of our toxic arsenal. These are the people who plant and harvest our fields and who, unlike the vast
majority of United States citizens, experience frontline contact
with the pesticides ensuring our bounty. They are the migrant and
seasonal workers employed across the country in United States agriculture. These workers suffer not only from poverty and illiteracy, but are mired in an occupation which presents alarming
health hazards while refusing to offer needed protection.
The poisoning of United States farmworkers by the use and
misuse of toxic chemicals is an enormous and immensely complicated problem. Both tangentially and directly, chemical use is
bound up in conflicting problems of agricultural economics, environmental policy, and a myriad of global and national political concerns. Moreover, pesticide regulation is an especially sensitive
topic, as it has become welded to another topic of even larger import: the availability of food for a hungry and swelling population.
If reduced pesticide use is directly correlated to reduced food production, a decision to limit pesticide use may be politically
impossible.
All of the above factors must be given adequate consideration
in order to reach a realistic solution to the problem of farmworker
poisoning. This article, however, focuses narrowly on the problem
of pesticide regulation as it affects farmworkers. More specifically,
it focuses on those individuals, both migrant and nonmigrant, who
labor for wages by planting, tending, and harvesting the fields of
our nation. In examining the problem, this article first reviews
past and current remedies and then proposes alterations to the
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current remedies designed to make them more effective. Four aspects of the problem are discussed: the need for stronger and
more defined regulations, the inadequate enforcement of existing
policies, the restrictions on judicial remedies, and finally the lack
of administrative funding and coordination. Although this article
confines itself to pesticide use as it affects farmworkers, its analysis and propositions may well apply to others in the agricultural
community who are similarly exposed to toxic chemicals.
Background to the Crisis
The arguments for and against our chemical and genetic control of the environment are often debated.3 For better or worse,
however, it would take nothing short of an agricultural and economic revolution for our culture to abandon its use of potent herbicides, pesticides, insecticides, and fungicides. 4 Agriculture is
currently the nation's biggest industry5 as well as its largest employer. 6 To vote-conscious legislators, these two factors present
powerful disincentives to tamper with the way the agriculture industry conducts business. Additionally, the status quo provides
7
food at prices which are low in cmparison with other countries.
Currently, our nation relies on the annual use of some 2.7 billion pounds8 of pesticides. 9 As stunning as that figure is, it is even
3. See, e.g., Kenneth

Weinstein, Amending FIFRA-An Industry View, 15

Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 5 at 10,130 (1985); Jay Feldman, Federal Pesticide Control Law: The Need for Reform, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 5 at
10,132 (1985).
4. Agriculture currently strives to control an estimated 10,000 species of harmful insects, 1,800 different weeds that cause serious economic losses, 1,500 diseases
caused by microorganisms, and some 1,500 kinds of nematodes that cause damage to

crop plants. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 1986 Fact Book of U.S. Agriculture 46 (1986).
5. Id. at 1.

6. Agriculture employs approximately 21 million people in some phase. (The
combined work forces of transportation, the steel industry, and the automobile industry equals only 2.7 million people). Id.
7. U.S. Dep't of Agric., The US. Food System-From Production to Consumption, Nat'l Food Rev. Y.B. 31 (1987).
One recent study conducted by the U.S.D.A. examined the potential economic
impact of banning certain pesticides used in the production of corn and soybeans.
Craig Osteen & Fred Kuchler, Potential Bans of Corn and Soybean Pesticides: Economic Implications for Farmers and Consumers (U.S. Dep't Agric. 1986). The report concluded that "society will bear a cost if any of the corn or soybean pesticides
examined were removed from the market because of reduced production efficiency
resulting from lower yields or higher production costs." Id. at 19.
8. Feldman, supra note 3, at 10,132. Differing sources will provide figures
above and below the one quoted. The confusion may be attributed to the form in
which pesticides are sold. Largely for reasons of economy, they are sold in concentrated amounts containing the active ingredient and some percentage of inert matter. They are then mixed by the grower with a medium such as water.
Perhaps a better indicator of pesticide usage is that more than 95% of the acre-
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more alarming in light of the fact that many of these chemicals
0
have not been tested for carcinogenic,' mutagenic," and terato12
genic effects. In 1982, a congressional subcommittee reported
that seventy-nine to eighty-four percent of pesticides lacked adequate 13 carcinogenicity testing, ninety to ninety-three percent
lacked adequate mutagenicity testing, and sixty to seventy percent
lacked adequate testing for their tendency to cause birth defects.14
The EPA has reviewed fewer than forty of the six hundred active
ingredients represented in the United State's arsenal of pesticides,
most of which have been in existence since the early 1970s. 15
age in our nation devoted to field crops is treated annually with one or more herbicides. Charles Benbrook & Phyllis Moses, EngineeringCrops to Resist Herbicides,
89 Tech. Rev. 54 (Nov.-Dec. 1986).
9. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA) defines pesticides as "(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of
7
substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant ......
U.S.C. § 136(u)(1982). The term "pesticide" as used in this article incorporates this
definition.
10. For the relationship between occupational pesticide exposure and cancer,
see generally Shelia Hoar, Aaron Blair, Frederick Holmes, Cathy Boysen, Robert
Robel, Robert Hoover & Joseph Fraumeni, Jr., Agricultural Herbicide Use and
Risk of Lymphoma and Soft-Tissue Sarcoma, 256 J. A.M.A. 1141 (1986); Aaron
Blair, Dan Grauman, Jay Lubin & Joseph Fraumeni, Jr., Lung Cancer and Other
Causes of Death among Licensed Pesticide Applicators, 71 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 31
(1983); International Agency for Research on Cancer, Vol. 30, IARC Monographs
on the Evaluation of the Carcinogenic Risk of Chemicals to Humans: Miscellaneous
Pesticides (1983); Annette Stemhagen, John Slade, Ronald Altman, & Joanne Bill,
OccupationalRisk Factors and Liver Cancer, 117 Am. J. Epidemiology 443 (1983);
and 0. Wong, W. Brocker, H.V. Davis & G.S. Nagle, Mortality of Workers Potentially Exposed to Organic and InorganicBrominated Chemicals,DBCP, TRIS, PBB,
and DDT, 41 Brit. J. Indus. Med. 15 (1984).
11. "Mutagenic" as used in this paper refers to those chemicals which can cause
heritable alterations of the genes or chromosomes of an organism.
12. For the relationship between occupational pesticide exposure and birth defects in children, see generally U.S. Dep't of Health Educ. & Welfare, Publ. No. 78174, Occupational Exposure During the Manufacture and Formulation of Pesticides-Criteria for a Recommended Standard (July 1978); Andrew Braun & Peter
Horowitz, Lectin-Mediated Attachment Assay for Teratogens: Results with 32 Pesticides, 11 J. Toxicology Envtl. Health 275 (1983); California Dep't of Food and
Agric., Selected Pesticides for Which There Have Been Some Concerns About a
Teratogenic Potential, HS 1091, Revised (DFA) (June 30, 1983).
13. The definition of "adequate testing" is somewhat elusive. Testing may be
found inadequate because of some gap in the initial studies. Such gaps occur as scientific advances make the original studies obsolete or, as the product is put into
use, toxic effects become apparent which were not originally tested for or
perceived.
14. EPA Regulatory Program Study, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of the House Comm. on
Agriculture, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1982).
15. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,293 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (citing Wash. Post, Sept. 25,
1986).
See also Feldman, supra note 3.
Incomplete pesticide health and safety reviews have plagued EPA
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While these figures may represent a willingness on the part of our
society to pay a certain environmental price for our prosperity, the
price should not fall disparately on one segment of the population.
A recent study has estimated the number of farmworker poisonings at more than 300,000 annually. 16 In an analysis completed
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
Dr. Jesse Ortiz of the University of Massachusetts concluded that
migrant farmworkers have a risk 24.76 times higher than that of
the general population of developing a pesticide related illness.17
Another expert, Dr. Eugene J. Gangarosa of the Emory University
School of Medicine, concluded that a thirteen-year study showed
"beyond any reasonable doubt that there are substantial risks of
harm to farmworkers in their workplaces. These risks are far in
excess of those prevailing in other industrial workplaces."18 Similarly, investigators at the University of Iowa have shown that Iowa
farmers face greater risks of six types of cancer than do city
dwellers.19
According to the National Institute of Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH), infant and maternal mortality rates among
farmworkers are 125% higher than those found in the general population. 20 Death rates from influenza and pneumonia are two hundred percent higher. 21 While farmworkers represent less than
four percent of the American labor force, they account for nearly
fifteen percent of the deaths and seven percent of the disablig
22
injuries.
When a welter of statistics such as these appear, one expects
some sort of public outcry. Yet little has been written and less has
since the 1972 amendments to [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act] FIFRA introduced requirements for a full battery of
acute and chronic tests for product registration. At the time, a 1975
deadline was imposed on the reregistration or reevaluation of the
safety of all pesticide products. The deadline was extended to 1977 and
then repealed.
Id. at 10,133.
16. Robert Wasserstrom & Richard Wiles, Field Duty: U.S. Farmworkers and
Pesticide Safety 3 (July 1985).
17. Legal Rights of Migrants and Seasonal Workers in 1985, 19 Clearinghouse
Rev. 1108, 1110-11 (1986).
18. Id. at 1111.
19. Leon Burmeister, Cancer Mortality in Iowa Farmers, 1971-78, 66 J. Nat'l
Cancer Inst. 461, 463 (1981).
20. Herbert Abrams, Case Studies in OccupationalHealth Programs: U.S.- Mexico Border IndustrializationProgram, Occupational Safety & Health Symp. 1978, at
42 (U.S. Dep't Health, Educ. & Welfare 1979).
21. Id.
22. Paolo Strigini, On the Political Economy of Risk: Farmworkers,Pesticides,
and Dollars, 12 Int'l J. Health Services 263, 274 (1982) (Strigini notes that these
figures are certainly underestimated).
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been done. Part of the problem is that, although farmworkers develop immediate and obvious effects of "acute" toxicity,23 the effects of "chronic" toxicity,24 such as cancers and birth defects, have
25
only recently received attention.
Without a large documented "body count" of farmworker
poisoning incidents, it has been difficult for farmworker advocates
to jar the proper authorities into action. There are numerous reasons why documentation has been so slow in accumulating. The
first factor relates to the legal status of the majority of North
American farmworkers. Since field work is traditionally seasonal,
and since most farmworkers are therefore migrant workers, statistics characterizing them are not readily available. 26 One recent estimate, however, stated that sixty to eighty percent of the farm
27
labor force is working in the U.S. illegally. Indeed, one agricul-

tural group, the Arizona Farm Workers (AFW) union, estimates
that eighty-five percent of its twelve thousand members are migrant laborers who come illegally to Arizona from Mexico each
28
year to harvest U.S. crops.
This illegal alien status may be one of the causes of the second factor, the fact that many farmworkers hesitate to report occurrences of poisonings to any sort of authority. It has been
estimated that the number of officially reported cases of residuerelated illness may be a very small fraction of the actual number,
possibly no more than one or two percent. 29 In an example of
mass poisoning startling enough to make local headlines, 175 field
workers were sprayed with a pesticide. 30 Only sixty-four members
of the group, or about one-third, reported for treatment and all
23. Acute toxicity refers to those effects which are immediate and obvious (e.g.
scorched lungs, blindness, nausea).
24. Chronic toxicity refers to those effects which do not occur immediately, but
may take a certain period of time or repeated exposure to develop. This would include cancers, certain lung diseases, or immune deficiencies.
25. For example, it was not until 1971 when the Bureau of Labor Statistics was
ordered by OSHA to begin surveying farmworkers, that even the crudest of data
became available. Strigini, supra note 22, at 273-74.
26. One group notes that "the United States does a better job of counting migratory birds than counting the millions of farmworkers who harvest and process
its crops." Report of the Task Panel on Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers, supra
note 2, at 1202 (1978) (citing Truman Moore, The Slaves We Rent (1965)).
27. Farm Workers Union Extends Its Reach Into Rural Mexico, Wall St. J., Oct.
15, 1986, at 23, col. 3.
28. Id.
29. Ephraim Kahn, PesticideRelated Illness in CaliforniaFarm Workers, 18 J.
Occupational Med. 693, 694 (1976). Kahn makes the distinction between the category of pesticide workers who mix and apply the pesticides and the much larger
group of farmworkers who are exposed to pesticide residues on the foliage, soil, and
standing water of the fields. His article focuses on the latter group.
30. Id. at 695 (table 3).
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were diagnosed as having been seriously poisoned. These results
represent an anomaly in comparison to other cases of mass poisoning, as they lack any reports of mild, intermediary, or imaginary
poisonings.31 This unusual pattern suggests that the number of
reported pesticide poisonings is unrepresentative of the actual
number of farmworkers suffering from the effects; that in fact
large numbers of unreported and under-reported poisonings were
taking place.
Two studies support this proposition. The first study compared a sample of farmworkers to a control group of people of the
same economic, social, and ethnic background, "literally living
next door," and found that the farmworkers suffered the specific
poisoning symptoms fifteen times more often than the control
group. 32 Of those who responded positively to the questions regarding the symptoms, less than six percent stated they had sought
treatment under the worker compensation laws, although they
were all legally entitled to do so. 33 The second study provided
some explanation for the discrepancy between actual and reported
cases of poisoning. In a relatively large sample of migrant and
nonmigrant farmworkers, it was found that approximately seventy
percent of all farmworkers had never heard of worker compensation. Of the remaining thirty percent, only eight percent knew
what it was. 34 There are several possible reasons for this lack of
knowledge, including certain cultural factors that discourage reporting, and haphazard recruitment policies of field-workers. 35
There are at least two other possible explanations for the
farmworkers' hesitancy to report. First, farmworkers seeking to
report a poisoning incident would have difficulty finding a recep31. Id. at 694-95. Kahn comments:
What about the Ill fellow crew members who worked with the 64 seriously poisoned cases? No mild cases were reported; no cases of imaginary illness caused by mass suggestibility; no cases of anxious
individuals who just wanted to be checked to make sure they weren't

poisoned. In any comparable episode in other occupational fields one
would expect all these other types of cases to occur.

Id. at 694.
32. Id. at 695 (citing California Community Studies on Pesticides: Morbidity and
Mortality of Poisonings, Report to Office of Pesticides (Bureau of State Services EH
USPHS Jan. 15, 1970)).
33. Id.
34. Kahn, supra note 29, at 696 (citing Richard Howitt, Pesticide Externality
Policy: an Optimal Control Approach (1975) (Doctoral dissertation, University of
California at Davis)).
35. For example, becauie of informal recruitment policies the farmworkers
may have no idea who actually owns or is leasing the field in which they are working. Even the labor contractor recruiting them may not be aware of when the field
was sprayed and with what substance. Kahn, supra note 29, at 696.
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tive ear. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the primary regulator of pesticides, 36 has no formal method of receiving
complaints from farmworkers. 37 In the three states with the largest farmworker populations (Florida, Texas, and California), only
California has a system which regularly reports occupational illness related to pesticides. Second, a report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to Congress noted that in eight of the
eleven states visited, the GAO found serious recordkeeping and reporting problems. 38 It found similar problems at five of the six regional EPA offices visited. 39 Undoubtedly, this record has not
escaped the notice of those people who must bear the consequences of such ineffectiveness and inefficiency. The rare individual who feels compelled to report, and who finds a reporting
mechanism available, must conclude that such efforts will be
wasted.
Frightened both legally and culturally by their status as illegal aliens, farmworkers are prevented by a third factor from obtaining a representative voice to express their dilemma. The
Arizona union mentioned earlier (the AFW) is somewhat unique
among its contemporaries in that it has no qualms about representing alien migrant workers. 40 Until recently, both the United Farm
Workers (UFW) and the AFL-CIO held fast to the traditional
union stance that undocumented workers take jobs away from
4
U.S. citizens. The UFW no longer holds this position. 1 To the extreme, one AFW organizer stated, "[t]he AFL-CIO here is the enemy of the undocumented workers." 42
Unfortunately, alien migrant workers and organizers face
even tougher times in the future since the passage of AFL-CIObacked legislation which will fine employers who knowingly hire
illegal aliens.43 Indeed, despite a movement among some of the
smaller unions to recruit alien workers into their ranks, such efforts are often destroyed by the timely rounding up of their mem36. Authority is granted to the EPA in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), as amended (7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982)), and the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended (21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982)).
37. U.S. General Accounting Office, Stronger Enforcement Needed Against
Misuse of Pesticides 20 (Oct. 15, 1981).
38. Id. at 20-21.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Farm Workers Union Extends Its Reach Into Rural Mexico, supra note 27,
at 23, col. 3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3365 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. IV 1986)).
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44
bers by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Organization is further hampered by a language barrier which separates many farmworkers culturally from a monolinguistic nation.
For the farmworker, the cumulative effect of these factors makes
the achievement of any organizational representation an almost
impossible task.
All of the above factors add up to this: as illegal aliens, the
majority of migrant farmworkers are without votes to represent
themselves; faced with hostility by the most powerful unions, their
voices lack the amplification many other holders of hazardous jobs
enjoy; without the tool of a common language they cannot be effective in communicating their needs and concerns to the legal
houses of our government; without any of these, the injuries and
the deaths remain untold and unrestrained.

Background to Farmworker Legislation
FIFRA
Theoretically, both statutory and regulatory vehicles exist for
the protection of workers involved with pesticide usage. In 1947,
Congress enacted the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).4s Originally, FIFRA was intended to ensure
the effectiveness and safety of the pesticide product when used in
compliance with regulated, labeled instructions. 46 Later, as public
awareness of pesticide use increased, and as technical aptitude in
the area of toxicology grew, FIFRA was extensively amended by
the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972
(FEPCA).47 Unlike the original FIFRA, FEPCA clearly estab48
lished its purpose as the protection of man and the environment.
Additionally, FEPCA extended FIFRA coverage to include regis44. Diana Solis, Rebuilding Drive: Their Ranks Eroded, Unions Try to Recruit

Illegal Immigrants, Wall St. J., Oct 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
45. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat.
163 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1982)).
46. Continental Chemiste Corp. v Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 1972).
47. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86
Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982)). FIFRA is widely used to
refer to "FIFRA as amended by FEPCA" and will be so used within this article.
FEPCA will be used when referring to the amendment specifically.
Six years after FEPCA, FIFRA was again amended under The Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 842 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 136 (1982)). Dissatisfied with the lack of speed with which the EPA was fulfilling
its mandates, the 1978 Pesticide Act expedited the registration process by providing
for registration on the basis of the generic chemical, by allowing conditional use registration, by developing limited data requirements for minor use pesticides, and by
providing a ten-year "exclusive use" of data period for developers of pesticides.
48. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D) (1982).
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tration requirements for pesticides distributed in intrastate commerce 49 and, for the first time, pesticide use was regulated, making
misuse both civilly and criminally punishable.50
In spite of this legislative initiative, the adoption of FEPCA
was followed by more than ten years of administrative confusion
as to who was in charge of establishing and enforcing safety standards for farmworkers using pesticides.S1
The EPA 's FarmworkerProtectionRegulation
At the time of the FEPCA amendment, both OSHA and the
EPA had created, or were beginning to promulgate, safety standards for field workers involved with pesticide use. For their part,
farmworkers were pushing for OSHA to promulgate and enforce
field sanitation regulations.5 2 In the final outcome, however,
OSHA would decline to take part in any such regulations.
Judicially, it had been determined that the EPA had sole authority to create and enforce all pesticide regulations and to establish safety standards. The determination sought to resolve a
conflict between the Department of Labor and the EPA over the
49. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1982).
50. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a) (1982).
51. See infra note 52.
52. 50 Fed. Reg. 15,086 (1985). See 41 Fed. Reg. 17,576 (1976). The history of
this proposal provides a prime example of administrative ball-dropping in the area
of farm worker protection and pesticide control. A petition was initiated in 1972 by
the Migrant Legal Action Program, Inc. (MLAP), on behalf of the National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens and several other organizations representing
seasonal and migrant farmworkers, requesting that OSHA promulgate safety and
inspection standards for farmworkers. Dissatisfied with OSHA's progress, the
MLAP brought suit in 1973 in U.S. District Court to compel OSHA to issue a standard. See National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens (El Congreso) v.
Dunlop, 425 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd 554 F.2d 1196 (D.C.Cir. 1977), revid
and remanded, 626 F.2d 882 (D.C.Cir. 1979).
The proposal was subsequently issued in 1976. Work on the standard was then
discontinued until 1982 when, in the face of pending litigation, OSHA resumed
work on the standard. On March 1, 1983, OSHA published an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) informing the public of OSHA's intention to develop a new field sanitation standard and soliciting comments. See 48 Fed. Reg.
8493 (1983). On March 1, 1984, OSHA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM). See 49 Fed. Reg. 7589 (1984). The proposed field sanitation standard received support from health experts and representatives of major health associations, religious leaders, and employee organizations. It was opposed by the
American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Council of Agricultural Employers, the forestry industry, and other individuals concerned with increased regulation on the farm. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,086 (1985). Finally, on April 16, 1985, OSHA
abandoned the field sanitation standard.
See also Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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regulation of farmworkers and their exposure to pesticides.53 The
appellants, Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc., argued
that the Department of Labor had authority to issue pesticide exposure regulations pursuant to the authority granted the Department under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of
1970.54 The appellees, Secretary of Labor and the Administrator
of the EPA, argued that the regulations issued by the EPA pursuant to FIFRA had eliminated the jurisdiction of the Department of
Labor. 55 The court held that the statutory authority granted the
EPA under FIFRA preempted the Secretary of Labor from
acting. 56
While this battle over authority was being waged, the EPA,
pursuant to its statutory authority,57 issued the current
Farmworker Protection Standards for Agricultural Pesticides. 5s
Enacted in 1974, the present Farmworker Protection rule provides
measures of safety through the use of three separate categories of
regulation. These categories provide for: (1) a general standard
regarding application of pesticides and reentry times5 9 for field
workers, (2) state pesticide standards, pesticide labeling and exemptions, and (3) worker warnings.60 As the statistics and examples cited earlier indicate, this rule has been largely ineffectual. s 1
Under the first category, regulating application and reentry,
53. Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
54. Id. at 1163. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651

(1982).
55. Brennan,520 F.2d at 1163.
56. Id.
57. 7 U.S.C. § 136w (1982).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 170 (1987).
It should be emphasized at this point that the "key control mechanism" in pesticide regulation is the pesticide label itself. FIFRA provides that it is unlawful to
misbrand a product or to use it in any manner inconsistent with its label. Sarah
Redfield, Chemical Trespass? An Overview of Statutory and Regulatory Ffforts to
ControlPesticide Drift, 73 Ky. L.J. 855, 864-65 (1985).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 170.2(a) (1987). "Reentry time" is defined under the regulation
as "the period of time immediately following the application of a pesticide to a field
when unprotected workers should not enter as provided for in § 170.3(b)."
60. 40 C.F.R. §§ 170.3-170.5 (1987). The restrictions set forth in this part do not
apply, however, to public pest control programs generally or to greenhouse treatments, animal treatments, and treatments of golf courses or similar non-agricultural areas, provided the treatments are applied to accordance with labeling
4
directions and restrictions. 40 C.F.R. § 170.4(c)(1)-( ) (1987).
61. In a recent legislative attempt to amend FIFRA, one senator commented
that "[a]gricultural labor is now the single most hazardous occupation in the United
States. Yet in the last two decades the sum total of EPA's actions to protect agricultural workers amounts to the adoption of one-half of a page of now antiquated
and meaningless regulations." 132 Cong. Rec. S15,290 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986)(statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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no owner or lessee can permit the application of a pesticide which
will expose unknowing workers to the pesticide. When spraying is
to take place, the area being treated must be vacated by unprotected persons. 62 This category also sets up generalized standards
for reentry times, allowing a worker to reenter a field only after
the "sprays have dried or the dust has settled," unless the worker
is wearing protective clothing.63 This section of the regulation further provides definite times for reentry by workers when a group
64
of twelve specified active ingredients are present in the pesticide.
Finally, the section provides that, notwithstanding the other requirements, a worker "should not be permitted to enter treated
fields if special circumstances exist which would lead a reasonable
man to conclude that such entry would be unsafe." 65
One of the most glaring deficiencies of the first category described above relates to the reentry time limits. 66 For example,
pesticides containing the chemical parathion have a reentry time
of forty-eight hours under the Farmworker Protection rule (the
highest federal reentry time imposed). 67 Researchers have found
that as parathion degrades it releases paraoxon, a compound
which, when absorbed through the skin, is fifty-five times more
toxic than the parent compound.6 8 Thus, the danger from exposure to parathion increases for a period of time after spraying,
making a longer reentry time vital. Unlike the EPA, California
has set the reentry time for chemicals containing parathion at a
minimum of fourteen days, and up to sixty days if used on citrus
crops. 69 This disparity between the federal and state reentry time
standards is not uncommon. 70
The second category set up by the Farmworker Protection
rule to improve pesticide regulation and safety grants authority to
the states to establish and enforce more restrictive field standards
62. 40 C.F.R. § 170.3(a) (1987). "No owner or lessee shall permit the application

of a pesticide in such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or
other persons except those knowingly involved in the application. The area being
treated must be vacated by unprotected persons."
63. 40 C.F.R. § 170.3(b)(1) (1987).
64. 40 C.F.R. § 170.3(b)(2) (1987). For the pesticides containing ethyl parathion,
methyl parathion, demeton, azodrin, carbophenothion, metasystox-r, bidrin, and endrin, the reentry time is set at 48 hours. For the pesticides containing guthion,
phosalone, EPN, and ethion, the reentry time is set at 24 hours.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 170.3(b)(3) (1987).
66. For a more in-depth examination of the background and deficiencies of
EPA reentry levels, see generally Wasserstrom & Wiles, supra note 16.
67. 40 C.F.R. § 170.3(b)(2) (1987).
68. Wasserstrom & Wiles, supra note 16, at 1.

69. 3 Cal. Admin. Code § 6772 (1986).
70. For a comparison of other Federal and California reentry intervals, see
Wasserstrom & Wiles, supra note 16, at 4.
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for laborers than those set forth by the EPA. The regulation also
stipulates that if the pesticide label bears more stringent field standards than those promulgated by the state, the label restrictions
will apply. 7 1 In short, the states are allowed to supersede federal
72
standards when the state standards are more restrictive.
The third category of the Farmworker Protection rule requires warnings to laborers working in pesticide-treated fields.
Although on the surface this section appears well-drafted, in practice it has several faults. To its credit, it does provide for both
English and non-English warnings. 73 Since the warning may be in
oral and/or written form, however, it is nearly impossible for authorities surveying a field of workers to determine who has been
appropriately warned. Farmworker organizations would, in most
circumstances, advocate only written or posted warnings in the
field which has been or will be sprayed. This would provide the
71. 40 C.F.R. § 170.4(a)-(b) (1987).
72. The limitation of such state authority has been the subject of recent congressional debate. 132 Cong. Rec. H7266-76 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1986). An amendment to FIFRA as proposed in Congress would have allowed the federal
government, through the EPA, to supersede state tolerance levels. Proponents of
this amendment argued that the current provision allows states to interfere with
interstate commerce through the use of pesticide tariffs on competitive commodities such as fruits and vegetables. 132 Cong. Rec. H7266-75 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1986)
(debate). Other arguments given by proponents include the contention that only
the federal government possesses the expertise necessary to set pragmatic and wellreasoned restrictions. Id. Also argued is the idea that varying state restrictions
may handicap the marketing of pesticides and make the creation of uniform label
restrictions nearly impossible. Id. Finally, it is proposed that the federal government could achieve a less parochial viewpoint on pesticide use, and thus, to the advantage of the farmworker, set more restrictive standards. Id.
These arguments have also been used by those who would have uniform reentry times established by the EPA superseding state reentry times. Somewhat surprisingly, those representing farmworker interests are not in favor of such an
amendment. These groups point to a comparison of state versus federal reentry
times and food tolerances. The states have consistently been far more restrictive.
Further, farmworker groups generally point out that it is much more difficult for a
proponent of a pesticide to lobby 50 state legislatures than one federal government.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 170.5(a) (1987). The text of this section provides that:
When workers are expected to be working in a field treated or to be
treated with a pesticide, appropriate and timely warning to such workers shall be given. The warning may be given orally and/or by posting
warning signs at the usual points of entrance to the field, and/or on
bulletin boards at points where the workers usually assemble for instructions. Where any person has reason to believe that a farm
worker is unable to read, he shall give the farm worker oral warning
and make reasonable effort to ensure understanding of such warning.
When required, warnings shall be given in appropriate languages other
than the English language. Oral warnings should be given in such a
manner as to inform workers of areas or fields which should not be
entered without protective clothing, the period of time the area or
field should be vacated and actions to take in case of accidental
exposure.
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inspector with a quick method of determining which fields should
be watched and perhaps more importantly, a method of proving violations of the regulation.
A second and perhaps larger problem with the "warnings"
category of the regulation is that although the farmworker must
be warned, the rule does not provide the substance of what the
warning must contain. To be useful to the farmworker, the warning should contain both the name of the pesticide and its known
level of toxicity.

74

In addition to the federal warnings regulation, several states
concerned with the issue of worker knowledge have enacted
worker "right to know" laws. 75 Of the twenty states with such
statutes, only ten of them appear to grant some measure of protection that applies to agricultural workers. 76 For example, a pertinent part of the the Florida right to know statute states:
"Employers shall furnish employees with instruction on the nature and effects of each toxic substance that is present in the
workplace." 77 Closer examination reveals two problems with this
statute and its protection of farmworkers. First, the term "employer" does not include "bona fide farmers" employing twelve or
fewer regular farmworkers or twenty-four or fewer seasonal
farmworkers.78 Second, "toxic substance" is defined as any chemical substance or mixture listed in the Florida Substance List. 79
Unfortunately, the Florida Substance List specifies that the provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Statute do not apply
to "[s]ubstances or mixtures which may be toxic but which are labeled pursuant to [FIFRA]."80
To its credit, the Florida statute does recognize "that an em74. Telephone interview with Marion Moses, Medical Director of the National
Farmworkers Health Group Regarding Farmworker Health and Safety (Nov. 28,
1986).
75. Donald Pederson, Regulation of Agricultural Employment, in 2 Agricultural Law § 6.58A (John Davidson ed. Supp. 1987). Among these states are: Alaska,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Louisiana
has a more limited statute.
76. Id. at § 6.59. These states are: Alaska, California, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
77. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 442.115(1) (West Supp. 1987).
78. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 442.102(8)(c) (West Supp. 1987). The statute does, however, apply to farms employing 24 or fewer seasonal farmworkers if work lasts 30
or more continuous days or more than 60 days in the same calender year.
79. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 442.102(21) (West Supp. 1987).
80. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 442.103(4)(e) (West Supp. 1987). See also Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 442.103(6) (the Occupational Health and Safety Statute is not applicable to substances not present on the Florida Substance List).
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ployee has an inherent right to know about the toxic substances at
his workplace" and "that the workplace often provides an early
warning mechanism for the rest of the environment." 81 It also
points out that "the tragic results of this exposure may not be realized for years or even for generations."8 2 Unfortunately, the state
of Florida does not recognize that farmworkers are also experiencing the "tragic results" of exposure to toxic chemicals in the
83
workplace.
While apparently recognizing the dangers presented by pesticides the Farmworker Protection rule fails to provide
farmworkers with a safe working environment. State "right to
know" laws have generally evaded the issue by simply drafting the
statutes or regulations around the farmworkers. Therefore, it is
necessary that both the EPA and individual states redraft their
regulations and statutes to provide a clear and comprehensive set
of rules which may then be effectively enforced.
FIFRA's Mission
A common criticism of FIFRA is that the Act, in its establishment of the EPA's express mission or goals, simply does not place
the EPA in a position where it can be an adversary to market in8
fluences and vigorously advocate the interests of farmworkers. 4
As authorized by FIFRA, the EPA may register a pesticide when
the Administrator finds that, when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, the pesticide will not
"cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment."8 5 The
81. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 442.101 (West Supp. 1987).

82. Id.
83. A second example of this conspicuous absence is provided by Donald Peder-

son in his essay. See generally Pederson, supra note 75. The New Jersey Worker
and Community Right to Know Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:5A-1 to 34:5A-31 (West
Supp. 1987), regulates only those persons engaged in business within certain limited
classifications provided by the Standard Industrial Classification Codes. These classifications cover: 20-39 (manufacturing); 46-49 (pipelines,transportation services,
communications, and electric, gas, and sanitary services); 51 (wholesale trade,
nondurable goods); 75 (automotive repairs, services, and garages); 76 (miscellaneous
repair services); 80 (health services); 82 (educational services); and 84 (museums,
art galleries, botanical and zoological gardens).
Absent are 01 (agricultural production-crops), 02 (agricultural productionlivestock), and 07 (agricultural services). Pederson, supra note 75, at § 6.59.
84. See, e.g., Ellen Greenstone, Farmworkers in Jeopardy, 5 Ecology L.Q. 69,

110-20 (1975); see also Report of the Task Panel on Migrant and Seasonal
Farmworkers, supra note 2, at 1245-47.
85. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)5 (1982). Under FIFRA, a pesticide can be registered with
the EPA once the Administrator finds that:
(A) its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it;
(B) its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply
with the requirements of [the Act];
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Act defines "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" as
"any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of
the use of any pesticide."8 6 This statutory mandate requires the
EPA to consider not only the risks to people, but also the powerful
economic factors which advocate for the registration of the pesticide. What is troublesome is not that such factors are considered,
but the conflict of interest created when one agency is weighing
the concerns of both.87
The EPA's representation of both people and agribusiness
concerns has produced a remarkable record of EPA lenience toward suspect chemicals in the United States. For example, in 1984
the EPA removed the grain fumigant ethylene dibromide (EDB)
from the market.8 8 This took place a decade after the National
Cancer Institute determined that EDB was a probable human
89
carcinogen.
Another example of the EPA's tendency to bend regulations
rather than ban the pesticide is their handling of the fungicide
Captan.90 Because Captan is not "acutely" toxic,9 1 it has been con(C)

it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment; and
(D) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment.
86. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1982). If the pesticide is restricted because of potential
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, a certified applicator must apply
or supervise the pesticide's application, and the Administrator may impose additional restrictions by regulation. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(l)(C)(ii) (1982).
87. The EPA itself was created in 1970, in part, because of congressional dissatisfaction with the USDA's lack of enforcement and its conflicting roles. Prior to
the creation of the agency, the USDA regulated pesticides and the FDA granted
tolerances.
88. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,289 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986)(statement of Sen. Proxmire).
89. In regard to this 10 year delay it was stated: "The process [the] EPA employs to reach such decisions known as special review or RPAR has simply failed,
plagued by bureaucratic footdragging, political interference, and unchecked influence by pesticide manufacturers." Id.
RPAR is an acronym for "Rebuttable Presumption against Registration." If
data becomes available that a pesticide presents a significant hazard, such evidence
is considered a RPAR. For example, EDB was a RPAR pesticide once it was shown
that it caused cancer in animals. Therefore, as an RPAR product EDB was not to
be registered unless the data was shown to be invalid or unreliable, or the estimated benefits of continued use outweighed the estimated risks. The EPA now
terms this heightened scrutiny a "Special Review." James Aidala, Pesticide Issues:
Reauthorization of P.L. 92-516, CRS Issue Brief 6 (June 8, 1987).
90. Captan is one of five pesticides that farmworker organizers are attempting
to ban. The other four are methyl bromide, parathion, Phosdrin, and Dinoseb.
Marion Moses, Medical Director of the National Farm Workers Health Group,
Statement to the Maryland State Legislature Regarding Farmworker Health and
Safety (Feb. 26, 1986).
91. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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sidered a safe fungicide. It is structurally similar, however, to
Thalidomide, a drug which caused thousands of infants in Europe
to be born without arms or legs.92 Even after an EPA determination that all use of the fungicide in food should be suspended, the
agency later recanted and allowed its continued use at the original
3
tolerance levels.9
The history of the EPA's highly lauded toll-free hotline is a
third example of how conflicts of interest within the EPA are
often resolved in favor of agribusiness interests. The EPA established the hotline in the mid-70s to permit workers to report pesticide poisoning incidents. 94 Since the EPA had no mandatory
mechanism for receiving complaints of pesticide poisonings, and
since few states have any reporting systems, this hotline was to be
a federal clearinghouse for farmworker complaints. Under
agribusiness pressure, however, all funds for the hotline were cut
off.95

It is not surprising that EPA regulations tend to favor
agribusiness, given that the Administrator of the EPA is required
to consult with the Secretary of Agriculture before considering
any new regulation.96 Further, in taking any final action on a regulation the EPA must consider "the effect of the regulation on
production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food
prices, and otherwise on the agricultural economy... ."97 Communication between the EPA and the Department of Agriculture is
commendable, but the EPA's current "mission" as set forth in
FIFRA does not place it in a position where it can effectively advocate for the welfare of a minority population. As an underrepresented minority, farmworkers are in need of an advocate who
can operate as an adversary to competing economic interests.
OSHA and FarmworkerRegulation
Given the EPA's position in the struggle between agribusi92. Marion Moses, Captan, Food & Just. 13, 13 (Jan. 1986). Dr. Moses cites a
case of a child born without arms or legs where it was known that the mother
worked picking grapes that had been sprayed with pesticides during the first three
months of her pregnancy. Id&
93. Dr. Moses reports that in 1977 it was found that fraudulent data had been

submitted to the EPA concerning Captan. Subsequently, Canada lowered its tolerance level on grapes to five parts per million (ppm). The U.S. tolerance level of
Captan on grapes remained at 50 ppm, 10 times that of Canada's. Id.
94. Report of the Task Panel on Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers, supra
note 2, at 1245.
95. Id.
96. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(2) (1982).
97. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(a)(2)(B) (1982).
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ness and farmworker health, many farmworker advocates would
prefer that OSHA take over the regulation of field and
farmworker safety. Unlike the EPA, OSHA's current mission
would not conflict with farmworker interests as do the EPA's economic and environmental concerns. 98 Unfortunately, OSHA has
not been willing to assume such responsibility. In a recent final
determination OSHA provided three reasons for its abandonment
of the area of field sanitation.9 First, in allocating its "scarce resources," the agency performs a risk balancing process whereby
the risks faced by fieldworkers are compared to the health risks
associated with the other industries under its auspices. 0 0 Because
of OSHA's other health concerns (e.g. asbestos, lead, various chemical carcinogens), the agency stated that a federal field sanitation
standard would be given "very low priority" in enforcement.10
Second, because some states have already moved to regulate the
area of pesticide safety, OSHA determined it was appropriate that
the states continue to do so, "in accordance with each state's specific concerns for public health and particular conditions in agriculture."102 A third argument articulated by OSHA for not
assuming the task of field sanitation regulation relates to the problem of the ageny's scope of authority. Since some courts have held
that OSHA regulations preempt state regulations,103 and since
OSHA is prohibited by law from taking any actions toward regulating farms with fewer than eleven employees, OSHA concluded
that it would be inefficient to promulgate regulations when the
states could provide both broader coverage of farmworkers and
broader enforcement of safety regulations.104 Given OSHA's
stance, a remedy for the farmworker dilemma does not seem
forthcoming from this agency despite farmworker efforts to persuade them otherwise.
OSHA has overlooked several points in advocating state responsibility for pesticide safety. First, unlike the EPA, most state
agencies are unable to administratively fine those who misuse pes98. OSHA's mission states: "The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy... to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe
and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources." 29
U.S.C.A. § 651(b) (West 1985).
99. 50 Fed. Reg. 15,086, 15,088 (1985). For a short history of OSHA's attempt to
draft fieldworker sanitation regulations, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp.
606 (D. N.J. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 774 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1985).

104. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,086, 15,088 (1985).
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ticides. 105 Obviously, this seriously hinders any state enforcement
actions. Second, enforcement actions by states are often questionable and inconsistent. I °6 Many cases are poorly investigated by
both the EPA and state agencies. I 0 7 For example, in one EPA region, the EPA conducted an inspection to determine whether a
pesticide had been used properly. Unfortunately, the inspection
occurred two months after the pesticide was applied in spite of
EPA policy requiring that pesticide use inspections be made during
or immediately following the actual application.l 08 Policy and regulation are of no value to the farmworkers without commensurate
enforcement.
Farmworkers, the EPA, and the Courts
JudicialReview of the EPA
One might question why the EPA's actions in the establishment of farmworker protection standards have not been subject to
judicial review under sources of law such as the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA).109 There are two primary reasons for the
dearth of lawsuits. First, as a matter of policy, farmworker advocates are hesitant to entrust the very agency they were trying to
strip of authority with the responsibility to create new regulations.
Second, in its present form, FIFRA does not require the EPA to
promulgate such rules. FIFRA's mission requires the EPA to "protect man and his environment"110 from unreasonable risk. FIFRA
does not require the EPA to promulgate any specific rules or standards regarding farmworkers. Therefore, if a suit were brought,
the litigants would be seeking judicial review of administrative
inaction. Generally, courts are reluctant to challenge administra105. Stronger Enforcement Needed Against Misuse of Pesticides, supra note 37,
at 15.
106. See id. at 9-12. "Our analysis of 2,855 randomly selected cases showed that
EPA and State officials took questionable enforcement actions in 491, or 17 percent,
of the cases reviewed for the period 1975 to 1980." Id. at 9.
107. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 13.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Id. at § 702. Whether judicial review may be procured under the APA where the statute itself provides no
private cause of action is not settled. William Timbers & David Wirth, Private
Rights of Action and JudicialReview in Federal EnvironmentalLaw, 70 Cornell L.
Rev. 403, 411-12 (1985). But see Sierra Club v. Peterson, 705 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th
Cir. 1983), where the Ninth Circuit held that FIFRA does not preclude judicial review of agency action through other sources of law such as the APA.
110. Merrell v. Thomas, 608 F. Supp. 644, 647 (D.C. Or. 1985), off'd, 807 F.2d 776
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 145 (1987).
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tive inaction, considering it an area not suitable for judicial
oversight."'
Given the lack of Congressional guidance as to specific
farmworker protection, it would be difficult for an advocate to
prove, or for a court to determine, that Congress desired a more
stringent program than that which currently exists. Should review of EPA inaction be sought, the EPA could simply point to its
existing farmworker protection regulation and labeling restrictions
2
as evidence that the EPA has fulfilled its statutory duties."
To remedy the latter problem, a bill to amend FIFRA was recently introduced in the House of Representatives which would
make promulgating rules regarding farmworker protection a
mandatory duty of the Administrator of the EPA."is The bill also
established specific areas for rules to address and mandated that
they be promulgated within a certain time limit."i 4 If this amendment had passed, and the EPA subsequently failed to take adequate action, the judiciary would have a clear statement of
Congressional intent to guide them, thus reducing much of the
confusion which now exists.
Another impediment to judicial review is "the inability of the
courts to analyze the problem."" 5 Analysis of any chemical problem requires a great deal of expertise on a purely scientific level.
The problem of pesticide regulation is further compounded by the
evolving state of scientific knowledge in the area of toxicology and
the influence of powerful socio-economic forces. While acknowledging the difficulty of scrutinizing the area of pesticides and pesticide regulations, however, review by the judicial branch remains
necessary for impartial evaluation of administrative decision making."16 It should be noted that a court order to hold a rulemaking
hearing would not substitute the court's expertise for that of the
111. See Peter Lehner, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 Colum.
L. Rev. 627 (1983). "Courts decline to act for four reasons: the lack of a particular
person harmed by a particular agency action, the lack of clear congressional intent
regarding proper agency conduct, the inability of courts to analyze the problem,
and the presumed availability of political controls over general nonimplementation." Id. at 627.
112. Lehner uses OSHA's failure to promulgate pesticide standards as an example of judicial review of administrative inaction. See id. at 680-89. Many of the arguments contained therein could be used to advocate for judicial review of the
existing Farmworker Protection rule and corresponding agency inaction.
113. H.R. 2580, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 39 (1985).
114. Id.
115. See supra note 111.
116. As noted earlier in this article, farmworker groups are rarely powerful or
popular enough to have political sway in either the congressional or executive
branches. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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7
EPA, but would only direct the agency to exercise its expertise."1
Attaining judicial review alone will not solve the farmworker
dilemma. Unless there are procedures for adequate implementation of the regulations and statute, the farmworkers would need to
procure a private method of enforcement.

Private Right of Action
Congress enacted FIFRA to establish, regulate and monitor
the United States' toxic arsenal. FIFRA's subsequent enforcement
raised two important questions. First, who, besides the EPA, has
the legal authority to enforce FIFRA's provisions when the proper
agency or official has failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty?
Second, who may enforce the act when that agency or official has
failed to investigate and prosecute a violation? Although the language of FIFRA does not expressly preclude a citizen or group of
citizens from bringing suit, several recent court cases have concluded that no private right of action exists for enforcement of
FIFRA regulations.118 Only the Administrator of the EPA or the
Attorney General for the United States may bring suit." 9 Given
the fact that both EPA120 and state enforcement efforts are inadequate, the lack of a private remedy is cause for concern and needs
to be explored further.121
117. See Lehner, supra note 111, at 688.
118. Eli Lilly & Co. v. EPA, 615 F.Supp. 811 (D.C. Ind. 1985). "Congress considered and explicitly rejected amendments which would have provided for classic 'citizen suits,' including suits by private citizens against the EPA Administrator for
failure to perform nondiscretionary duties or for failure to investigate and prosecute violations." Id. at 815. See also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635
F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d
77 (9th Cir. 1983); Safe Alternatives for Fruit Fly Eradication v. Berryhill, 22 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1984); People for Envtl. Progress v Leisz, 373 F.
Supp. 589 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Almond Hill School v U.S.D.A., 768 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.
1985).
119. See, e.g., Leisz, 373 F. Supp. at 592 ("[Ihe Congressional intent to us at least
is clear enough: Enforcement of FIFRA is reserved by Congress to the Environmental Protection Agency and to the Office of the Attorney General, and violations
thereof are not the proper subject of civil actions by citizens"). Statutory authority
to enforce FIFRA is found at 7 U.S.C. § 136g(c)(1-3) (enforcement) and § 1361 (penalties) (1982).
120. See generally Stronger Enforcement Needed against Misuse of Pesticides,
supra note 37.
See also 132 Cong. Rec. H7267-71 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1986); Report of the Task
Panel on Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers, supra note 2, at 1242-49 (1978);
Strigini, supra note 22, at 284-85.
121. A provision establishing private citizen suits allowing individuals to sue for
damages or equitable relief was part of a recent Congressional attempt to amend
FIFRA. See 131 Cong. Rec. S7-86-95 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1985). See also H.R. 2580,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33 (1985).
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In Fiedler v. Clark,122 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
although the express language of FIFRA vested the district courts
"with jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain violations" of the Act,123 FIFRA did not expressly grant nor
preclude a private right of action by a private citizen. 12 4 Since pri5
vate rights of action may be either express or implied,12 the court
went on to examine the language of FIFRA and its legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to create an implied
private right of action.' 26 In making its determination, the court
made use of the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v.
Ash .127

In Cort, the Supreme Court used four factors to determine
whether Congress intended to create an implied private right of
action: (1) whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"; (2) whether there is explicit
or implicit indication of legislative intent to create or deny a remedy; (3) whether such a remedy is consistent with the underlying
purposes of the act; and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally given to state law, "so that it would be inappropriate to
28
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law."1
The Fiedler court concluded that the first two factors given
in Cort were not present in the legislative history of FIFRA and,
therefore, no private right of action was created.l 2 9 The court held
that FIFRA did not, in accordance with the Cort test, "unmistakably focus on any particular class of beneficiaries whose welfare
Congress intended to further." 3 0 Apparently, the Ninth Circuit in
Fiedler found no conflict with historical interpretations of the D.C.
Circuit in Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Bren122. 714 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983). In Fiedler, appellant brought suit against Hawaii's pineapple growers, dairy farmers, dairy processors, the State of Hawaii and
the United States for declaratory and injunctive relief against contamination of
dairy products with the pesticide heptachlor. Id. at 79.
123. 7 U.S.C. § 136n(c) (1982).
124. Fiedler, 714 F.2d at 79.
125. William Timbers & David Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in FederalEnvironmentalLaw, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 403, 405 (1985).
126. Fiedler,714 F.2d at 79. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981) ("[The] focus ... in any case involving the implication of a right of action...
is on the intent of Congress"); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754,
770 n.20 (1981) ("whether a statute creates a private right of action is ultimately [a
question] 'of congressional intent' ").

127. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
128. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
129. Fiedler,714 F.2d at 79. Accord, In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635
F.2d 987, 991-92 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
130. Fiedler,714 F.2d at 79 (citing Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294).
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nan.131 In Brennan, the D.C. Circuit cited the Senate Committee
on Agriculture and Forestry to emphasize FIFRA's specific protection of farmworkers. The Committee stated: "[t]he committee believes there can be no question about the matter, but takes this
occasion to emphasize that the bill requires ... the labeling and
classification of pesticides be such as to protect farmers,
farmworkers, and others coming in contact with pesticides or pesticide residues." 132 While this latter language and decision indicate
that FIFRA was focused toward at least one "particular class of
beneficiaries," the Ninth Circuit in Fiedler did not so find, holding
that the language of the statute did not indicate an intent to provide for private rights of action 133 and that the legislative history
of the Act confirmed this.iS4
In addition to finding no right to bring private suits under
FIFRA itself, courts have denied a cause of action brought through
42 U.S.C. § 1983.135 Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action
for either damages from or equitable relief against state officials
who deprive individuals of their federal rights, even though no
such action may be provided for under the Act itself.136 The availa"
The farmer and the farmworker are the
131. 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
persons most likely to be adversely and immediately affected by pesticides and they
are the most obvious object of the bill's protection.'" Id. at 1169 (citing 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4063).
132. S. Rep. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 43-44, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4063.
133. "FIFRA does not 'unmistakably focus on any particular class of beneficiaries whose welfare Congress intended to further.' Rather, the Act states 'no
more than general proscription of certain activities.' Such language does not indicate an intent to provide for private rights of action." Fiedler, 714 F.2d at 79 (quoting Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294).
134. "Congress considered and explicitly rejected amendments that would have
authorized citizen suits, including suits against the EPA Administrator for failure
to perform nondiscretionary duties or for failure to investigate and prosecute violations." Fiedler,714 F.2d at 79 (citing S. Rep. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4092, 4106, 4125; S. Rep. No. 838, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3993, 4060-61,
4090; Conf. Rep. No. 1540, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 4130, 4134).
At least part of the reasoning for Congress' opposition is stated in People for
Envtl. Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp. 589 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (citing S. Rep. 838, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4025, 4060).
[The Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee] position was based
on its opinion that the executive branch should have the sole responsibility for administering and enforcing the new statute, its concern for
placing further burdens on already overburdened federal courts, and
the possibility that the amendment might ... interfere with the orderly administration of law.
Id. at 592.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Almond Hill School v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 768 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
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biity of section 1983 to enforce a particular statute depends on two
factors. "First, Congress must not have foreclosed private enforcement of the statute in the statute itself. Second, the statute must
create 'enforceable rights.' "137
In Almond Hill School v. United States Department of Agriculture,138 the Ninth Circuit held that Congress had foreclosed
private remedies under section 1983 because the enforcement
schemes expressed in FIFRA were sufficiently comprehensive to
suggest exclusivity of remedial devices. 3 9 The court also noted
that enforcement of FIFRA through section 1983 would "undermine the 'balance, completeness and structural integrity' of the
Act's express enforcement scheme."'140 As in Fiedler, the court
cited the legislative history of FIFRA, indicating that the Act's remedial exclusivity was a deliberate effort by Congress to insert
141
and maintain flexibility in dealing with violations of the Act.
As an example of this flexibility, the court cites section 136d(a)(1)
of FIFRA which provides for the continued use of a cancelled pesticide, even if the pesticide has been cancelled for noncompliance
with the Act if such use is not inconsistent with the "purposes" of
the Act.142 Ironically, this very example illustrates why FIFRA
is not balanced, complete, or structurally sound as far as the
farmworker is concerned. This "flexibility" allows the EPA to
work against the interests of the farmworkers and, combined with
the remedial exclusivity, for the interests of agribusiness.
The court also attached importance to the Act's express dele143
The
gation of primary enforcement responsibility to the states.
court stated that "[p]rivate actions under section 1983 to enforce
FIFRA would be inconsistent with the policy of state and federal
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulasubjects, or causes
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ....
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
137. Almond Hill School, 768 F.2d at 1035 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1981)). Although both
factors were listed in the above case, Almond Hill School was decided on the first
factor, and therefore no discussion of whether the Act creates "enforceable rights"
is present.
138. 768 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1985).
139. Id. at 1036.
140. Id. at 1037.
141. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 92-838, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 3993, 4012-13).
142. Almond Hill School, 768 F.2d at 1037-38.
143. Id. at 1038 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1).
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cooperation encouraged in the Act's express enforcement
scheme."44 For those farmworkers suffering from increased rates
of cancer and birth defects, it is difficult to understand how
FIFRA's express enforcement scheme could be "undermined"
when federal enforcement of FIFRA has been so ineffectual.
Other Farmworker Legislation
Protection of Child Farmworkers
There is one area of farmworker regulation which has received more severe scrutiny and judicial inspection than has generally been accorded other matters of pesticide regulation. This area
concerns children aged twelve and under, who are protected under
the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1977.145 Normally,
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) the minimum age for
persons working in hazardous areas of agriculture is sixteen.
Twelve-year-olds may work in non-hazardous agriculture during
non-school hours with written parental permission. 148 In addition,
children under twelve may work only on small farms not covered
by the FLSA, and only with parental permission. Section
13(c)(4)(A) of the FLSA, however, permits the Secretary of Labor
to waive restrictions on employment of ten and eleven year olds in
short season agricultural harvesting, where eight enumerated con47
ditions are fulfilled as demonstrated by "objective data".1
In National Association of Farmworkers Organizations v.
Marshall,148 the petitioner sought to prevent the employment of
some 3900 children under the age of eleven as harvesters of Washington's strawberry crop. The petitioners in Marshall challenged
the Secretary's waiver, arguing that he had failed to base his
waiver on objective data submitted by the applicant. The court
144. Almond Hill School, 768 F.2d at 1038.
145. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 13(c)(4)(A), 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1977), as
amended by 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
Children are at a higher risk of harm from exposure to pesticides than are
adults. One court noted that children exposed to such chemicals suffer from
"'greater uptake of [pesticides] in the developing tissue and organ systems of
younger aged children,' 'increased susceptibility to asthma,' 'increased susceptibility
to agents that interfere with calcium metabolism,' 'increased susceptibility to agents
that interfere with protein utilization,' and 'increased sensitivity to hormonal imbalances."' National Ass'n of Farmworkers Org. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 614 n.42
(D.C. Cir. 1980)(citing Memorandum from Peter Infante, Director, Office of Carcinogen Identification and Classification, OSHA to Grover Wrenn, Director, Health
Standards Program, OSHA (June 16, 1978)).
146. 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
147. 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
148. 628 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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149
held that since the waiver provision specified "objective data,"'
and since no such data establishing pesticide or other chemical tolerance limits for children was available, the Secretary's use of the
"best available evidence"'150 test instead of "objective data" would
violate Congressional intent. The court enjoined the Secretary
from issuing waivers as to ten and eleven year olds until objective
data on pesticide and chemical tolerance limits for children are
produced.151
In deciding Marshall, the court balanced the economic burden to growers denied waivers (a burden the court noted would ultimately shift to consumers) against the irreparable harm to
children exposed to pesticides and chemicals through such employment waivers. 5 2 The court concluded that "any possible reduction
in the price of produce that might result from denying preliminary
relief would be only short-term, and would never approach the
value of the children's health to the nation." 5 3 Hence, through the
FLSA and "in the interests of justice"' 5 4 children have protection

149. Id. at 606. The court relied upon the following statutory authority. Waivers
may be granted only if:
(ii) the employment of the individuals to whom the waiver would apply would not be deleterious to their health or well-being;
(iii) the level and type of pesticides and other chemicals used would
not have an adverse effect on the health or well-being of the individuals to whom the waiver would apply.
Id at 607 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(c)(4)(A) (1979)).
The court also noted the following conditions which must be met:
Other conditions necessary for waiver include proof that individuals
older than 11 are not available; that the industry has traditionally and
substantially used employees under age 12 "without displacing substantial job opportunities for individuals over sixteen years of age"; 29
U.S.C. § 213(c)(4)(A)(v) (1976); and the crop to be harvested is short
season and dependent on child labor.
Once granted, waivers must require that employment only be during non-school hours; that the children commute daily between work
and permanent residence; that the employment extend only during 8
weeks per calendar year; and that any other conditions set by the Secretary will be followed.
Marshall, 628 F.2d at 607 n.5 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4)(B) (1976)).
150. Marshall, 628 F.2d at 619. The Secretary's best available evidence consisted
of secondary reviews of existing research literature which revealed that "most critical information required for evaluating potential hazards to children is lacking."
Id. at 618 (citing Clement Final Report, J.A. Vol. B at 5). The Labor Department
did not seek any new studies; "it merely asked [a professional consulting firm] to
review existing literature, none of which dealt with children's exposure to pesticides." Marshall, 628 F.2d at 619.
151. Marshall, 628 F.2d at 623.
152. Id. at 616.
153. Id. See also Washington State Farm Bureau v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 296 (9th
Cir. 1980) (holding that in refusing to grant waivers for strawberry growers using
the pesticides Captan and Benomyl, the Secretary of Labor was acting neither arbitrarily nor capriciously).
154. Marshall,628 F.2d at 623.
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unavailable to their elders.15 5
Creation of a Private Right of Action
Ours is an adversarial system, and it works quite well to enforce laws and regulations when there are adversaries to contend
in the judicial arena. If governmental agencies cannot, or will not,
advocate either administratively or judicially for the rights of a minority in the area of pesticide regulation, then the search for a private judicial remedy must resume.
A group of private citizens was allowed to bring suit to en5
force FIFRA in one early case. The court in Kelley v. Butz' 6 distinguished between a group of private citizens and a state attorney
general acting on behalf of the people of Michigan. Although Kelley recognized the statutory bar to private law suits, the court
found no similar expressions of legislative intent to bar "suits by a
sovereign state acting in furtherance of its legitimate interests and
15 7
Citing the Supreme Court case
on behalf of its entire citizenry."'
15
of Hardinv. Kentucky Utilities, as well as Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 159 the court found "standing" under
FIFRA for the Michigan Attorney General to petition1the court to
restrain the Forest Service from violating the statute. 6o
Kelley has been cited for its sovereign state/private citizen
155. In addition to the Fair Labor Standards Act, farmworkers have also been
placed under the umbrella of several other pieces of legislation. These include the
Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963, the National Labor Relations Act, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, the Wagner-Peyser Act, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, and various state Worker Compensation laws. For an
explanation of how these acts and laws affect farmworkers, see John Davidson, 2
Agricultural Law § 6 (1981). None of these acts or laws has greatly impacted the
issue of pesticide poisoning.
Such extensive coverage by legislation with so little effect has led at least one
group to conclude that:
[The failure of Federal programing to meet the needs of migrant and
seasonal farmworkers is the result of the lack of coordination and the
fragmentation of programs designed to serve them. [Still others] hold
that the failure to enforce existing laws intended to protect them is a
major cause of their continuing plight.
Report of the Task Panel on Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers, supra note 2, at
1197.
156. 404 F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Mich. 1975). In Kelley, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief to prevent the United States Forest Service from spraying a national forest with chemical defoliants.
157. Id. at 940.
158. 390 U.S. 1 (1967) (conferring standing, despite the lack of specific statutory
provision for such, to the class of persons which the statute in issue was designed to
protect).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
160. Kelley, 404 F. Supp. at 941. The court also cited the tests for standing enumerated in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971).
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"distinction", but its reasoning and result have not been repeated.161 The reason may be that, in Kelley, the court appears to
have combined the separate issues of standing and cause of action
to achieve its unique result.162 The court in Kelley found standing,
despite acknowleging the fact that Congress had provided no express or implied private right of action. 63 This finding is legally
inappropriate. The proper approach for determining the issues of
cause of action and standing is to determine first, whether there is
a private cause of action and second, if there is one, who in this
class of litigants has standing to sue. Where the matter to be litigated is constitutional, the court may create a private cause of action.164 Where the matter to be litigated is statutorily created and
controlled, as in the case of FIFRA, Congress may limit the class
65
of litigants who may enforce the rights which they have created.1
The courts are then left to determine who in a potential class of
litigants has standing to bring suit. 1 Therefore, since no court has
held that FIFRA provides either an implied or express private
right of action, the court in Kelley should not have granted standing and may have extended its jurisdiction where legally it had
none.
It may be, however, that the substance of the Kelley decision
can provide a basis for a judicial remedy to the farmworkers' quandary. Currently, because of both societal and legal obstacles,
farmworkers are unable to advocate effectively for themselves.
Nor can farmworkers rely on an impartial governmental agency to
advocate for them. Therefore, the farmworker is left without a
representative sufficiently adversary to industry and business interests to vigorously advocate the farmworker dilemma.167
Neither the EPA's "mission" nor its statutory powers allow it to
place itself in opposition to powerful economic interests. OSHA
apparently does not feel it is capable administratively or statuto161. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 615 F. Supp. 811,
815 (D.C. Ind. 1985). The court in Eli Lilly cited Kelley "[w]ithout necessarily accepting [its] distinction .... " Id.
162. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of RR. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) "Since we hold that
no right of action exists, questions of standing and jurisdiction become immaterial."
Id. at 465 n.13.
163. Kelley, 404 F. Supp. at 941.
164. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1978).
165. See id.

166. To have standing, a plaintiff must be sufficiently adversary to the defendant
to qualify as an Article III case or controversy, or to overcome prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
167. See, e.g., Greenstone, supra note 84. This article advocates ceding authority
to regulate pesticides as they relate to farmworker safety to OSHA. It was written
prior to OSHA's final determination declining such responsibility.
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rily of providing adequate protection to the farmworkers. As private citizens, farmworkers are unable to enforce the statute that
was written to protect them.
Congress' hesitancy in this area may be due to a fear of
drowning the United States' largest industry in a sea of litigation.
Given the existing importance of pesticides in our country, the
lack of understanding of their biological consequences, and the
knowledge that the agricultural seasons are often precarious and
do not adapt themselves to judicial timetables, Congress is justifiably hesitant to throw the area of pesticide regulation open to judicial remedies.
Perhaps, however, in the manner of Kelley v. Butz, a judicial
remedy could be crafted so that groups of farmworkers or their
representatives could be their own advocates. In Kelley, the court
allowed the attorney general to bring suit on behalf of the citizens
of the state. If FIFRA were amended by Congress to allow the attorneys general of each state to bring enforcement suits, as the
court allowed in Kelley, then farmworkers would have acquired
fifty advocates with the authority to bring suit to have FIFRA's
provisions enforced. Such an amendment would serve two purposes. For the farmworker it would provide an additional source
of advocates to hear their complaints and to obtain remedies. For
the marketplace, concerned about paralyzing the industry with
lawsuits, it would limit the number of litigants who could bring
suit and help ensure that the lawsuits brought are meritorious.
An alternative method of providing private enforcement of
FIFRA would be to grant a private cause of action but to limit the
language of such an amendment to include only those individuals
demonstrating actual work-related injury. Under this approach,
only those individuals who had been injured as a result of direct
contact with the pesticide, e.g. those suffering acute or chronic
symptoms of poisoning, would be allowed to bring suit. Although
these injuries might prove difficult to establish, this approach
would allow farmworkers to present their own cases and to concentrate their resources as they see fit.
As noted earlier, the court in Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan168 concluded that OSHA could not be
compelled to establish pesticide safety standards over EPA's authority. The court assured the petitioner in Brennan, however,
that, "[i]f, in the future, the enforcement provisions of FEPCA are
found to be inadequate, we are confident that Congress stands
168. 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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ready to rectify the situation."' 69 It is now more than ten years
since Brennan, and the enforcement provisions of FEPCA have
been found "inadequate." By providing a limited private right of
action to concerned groups of farmworkers, Congress could create
an enforcement mechanism which would grant aggrieved
farmworkers access to a greatly increased number of advocates
who will be more responsive to farmworker complaints.
Admittedly, cases may be made where the general population
is suffering from such residual effects of pesticide use as groundwater and food contamination. Where such cases are found, however, there exists the political and social force to effect a
change. 170 Such has not generally been the case regarding
farmworkers.
Other Considerations and Perspectives
Perhaps the largest obstacle to improved knowledge regarding toxicity is the sheer expense of obtaining that knowledge. The
development of an effective pesticide is incredibly expensive and
time-consuming. It is estimated that for every agrichemical that
reaches the market for commercial use, ten thousand or more
"candidate" chemicals must be screened and evaluated.171 Once
the candidate is selected, the manufacturer may spend $30 to $40
million or more to develop and commercialize the product.172 The
creation or modification of a manufacturing plant adds another
$100 million or more to the final price tag. 173 This entire process
may take from seven to ten years. Assuming that a patent, which
lasts seventeen years, was placed on the chemical early in this process, a manufacturer is left with perhaps ten years in which to
recoup this investment. These time and money concerns discourage pesticide developers from spending long periods of time and
74
more money on extensive toxicity testing.1
Recently, Congress debated legislation which would lengthen
the seventeen year patent period so that if a company is required
to spend more money and time testing the toxic nature of a compound, then it will have a greater length of time in which to
169. Id. at 1169-70.
170. Witness California's recent passage of Proposition 65 enacting the Safe

Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Cal. Health & Safety Code
§§ 25249.5 -.13 (West 1988).
171. National Agricultural Chemicals Ass'n, Agricultural Chemicals: From Laboratory to Commercial Label 7 (1984).
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id.
174. Charles Gilbert, The Increasing Riskiness of the Pesticide Business, Farm
Chemicals 20, 26 (April, 1978).
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recoup that expense. 175 The intent of such legislation would be to
provide an economic incentive for agrichemical companies to develop more sophisticated and less toxic chemicals. The obvious argument against the latter line of reasoning is that by guaranteeing
a monopoly to the producer the price of the product will be kept
artificially high for a period of time.176 But given the expenses encountered in this process, and the fact that the price of a pesticide
is constrained by the limited resources of its agricultural consumers, such legislation would appear to be a reasonable means to
achieve a desirable goal.
Registration and reregistration with the EPA is an equally
arduous task given the fact that the EPA's ability to examine data
supplied by the chemical company is limited. Both industry and
environmentalists agree that the EPA has insufficient resources to
7
accumulate and interpret the data already available.17
While patent extension may induce pesticide research in
large acreage crops, such as corn and soybeans, such legislation
would do little to spur industry research in specialty or minor
crops, e.g. most fruits and vegetables. These latter crops, while economically important collectively, do not have large enough markets individually to support the high investment costs necessary to
develop an effective range of pesticides. 178 Therefore, these growers may have to choose between using a pesticide of dubious safety
or allowing their livelihood to be destroyed by adverse environmental elements. The problem is compounded for U.S. growers of
specialty or minor crops who face international competition that
does not recognize U.S. pesticide limitations.179 Ignoring the
175. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,334-40 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
176. The average price decrease for three major pesticides after the generic producer entered the market was 18.1%. The average price increaseover the same period for three major pesticides for which there are no generic producers was 9.9%.
132 Cong. Rec. S15,333-34 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (citing Farmland Industries, Inc.,
detailed sales information).
177. 132 Cong. Rec. 515,333-34 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986). See also Feldman, supra
note 3, at 10,134.
178. Currently, registration of chemicals for minor or special use crops is expe-

dited through the IRA Project. The IRA Project aids in the development and assembly of necessary registration data and in the preparation and submission of

petitions for pesticide clearances on food, feed, fiber and ornamental commodities.
Since 1963, the Project has obtained 2,479 clearances. Project Statement, A National Agricultural Program: Clearances of Chemicals and Biologics for Minor or

Special Uses (Oct. 1, 1982-Sept. 30, 1987).
Additionally, a grower may obtain an "experimental use permit" under 7
U.S.C. § 136c(a)(1982), an emergency exemption under § 136w(b), or a state registration for special local need under § 136c(f).
179. Six percent of all vegetables, 25 % of all fruit, and 98% of all coffee beans
are imported into the United States. Of the 94 pesticides used on coffee beans in
foreign countries, 76 have no allowable U.S. tolerance. Yet, the beans are allowed
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alarming health implications of such usage, it is apparent that foreign growers have a production advantage of inexpensive pesticides that allow them to bring their produce to the market at a
lower price.
Insufficient financial resources can also account for the
EPA's poor performance in the area of monitoring pesticide effects. In addition to monitoring these effects, the Administrator
has been given the responsibility for formulating and periodically
revising, in cooperation with other Federal, State, or local agencies, a national plan for monitoring pesticides.18 0 A clearly-defined
and well-executed monitoring plan would go far toward obviating
the perennial complaint of any toxicity study: that the subject is
hopelessly mired in a quagmire of the unknown.' 8 '
As the Florida statute cited earlier notes, the workplace can
provide an "early warning mechanism."18 2 Currently, "chronic
risks" are determined almost solely through translated animal
data. 8 3 As sophisticated as these experiments might be, they cannot fully account for the complex differences between the subject
animals and the human species. An adequate monitoring system
would provide the human data needed to create regulations and
would provide additional protection to the exposed farmworkers.
A final consideration is the addition of an economic burden to
growers who may already be facing a financial crisis. Although to
date individual states have been far more responsive to the
farmworkers' dilemma than the federal government, eventually
to be imported. See 132 Cong. Rec. S15,336 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Harkin citing a GAO report).
180. 7 U.S.C. § 136r(a-c) (1982). Subsection (c) describes this monitoring in detail. It states:
The Administrator shall undertake such monitoring activities, including, but not limited to monitoring in air, soil, water, man, plants,
and animals, as may be necessary for the implementation of this subchapter and of the national pesticide monitoring plan. The Administrator shall establish procedures for the monitoring of man and
animals and their environment for incidental pesticide exposure, including, but not limited to, the quantification of incidental human and
environmental pesticide pollution and the secular trends thereof, and
identification of the sources of contamination and their relationship to
human and environmental effects. Such activities shall be carried out
in cooperation with other Federal, State, and local agencies.
181. See generally Toxic Substances Strategy Committee, Toxic Chemicals and
Public Protection (May, 1980); Environmental Quality, 15th Annual Report of The
Council on Environmental Quality (1984).
182. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 442.101 (West Supp. 1986). See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
183. Strigini, supra note 22, at 277. "Translated animal data" refers to data gathered from animal studies and then extrapolated to fit human biology. From this
process conclusions are drawn concerning the effects of pesticides on humans.
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states may be reluctant to burden their farmers when their neighboring states have no obligation or inclination to do so. Therefore
a national, and eventually international, pesticide regulation policy
must be formulated so that there is no economic disincentive for
promoting environmental and human health.
Conclusion
The argument most commonly made in favor of maintaining
FIFRA in its present form is that when used properly, pesticides
have not caused any human tragedies.184 This argument is somewhat insensible. First, a pesticide can only be "properly used"
when there is enough known about its effects to state what is
proper and what is not. Secondly, "proper use" depends upon who
is doing the defining. California decided that it is only proper for a
worker to enter a field twenty-three days after it has been sprayed
with parathion. The EPA decided that forty-eight hours is sufficient. If two growers each choose a different reentry standard,
which grower is "properly using" the pesticide? Finally, experience has proven that a pesticide, like most everything else in society, will only be "properly used" if someone is around to insure
that it is so used.
Those who would retain FIFRA in its present form are apparently satisfied with its enforcement; farmworkers are not.
Even if parts of FIFRA were rewritten as has been discussed, any
revision would be effectively nullified without enforcement procedures and mechanisms. To argue by analogy, properly driven, a
car has never been responsible for a pedestrian accident. But even
though everyone knows how to drive properly, pedestrian accidents happen all the time for a variety of reasons. Therefore we
create laws to protect pedestrians and most importantly, we enforce them.185
Three reforms are needed to provide adequate protection for
farmworkers. First, a reporting system must be created so that the
184. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 10,130.
185. As one author notes:
While workers may learn from experience how to deal with, or avoid,
certain hazards, this can hardly apply to chronic and certainly not to
long-term ones. In any case, not only is such a learning process unfair
to workers, on whose bodies it takes place, but it is also slow and inefficient, particularly with those who have lesser experience with the

hazards, including workers' families and the general public. Furthermore, the "body count" is bound to start anew, as soon as a new
formula or procedure is introduced by the chemical or the agricultural

industry.
Strigini, supra note 22, at 281.
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true scope of the pesticide problem as it affects farmworkers can
be shown. To gather the necessary information, the EPA must establish mechanisms and procedures to both contact and be contacted by farmworkers. Without such a system, researchers cannot
identify problem chemicals and uses, and the poisoning of
farmworkers will continue.
Second, existing pesticide laws and regulations need to be created, refined and enforced. With the appropriate amendment of
FIFRA, the courts could oversee promulgation of these needed
regulations and enforce those that exist. The courts could also
provide impartial guidance in this area as well as affording protection to an unrepresented minority. Enforcement would be
achieved most effectively through the creation of a limited private
right of action which would allow farmworkers to be their own advocates but in a manner cognizant of the needs of society.
Third, administrative funding must be adequate for the assignment given the agency. Increased regulation will benefit no
one if the scientific issues remain undefined and obscured, conflicting with themselves and with political caprice. Increased funding
could come from increased government allocations or from the developers of the pesticides as a requirement for registration. If the
developers are required to provide the additional research, then
legislators must work to retain needed economic incentives for the
development of more sophisticated and less toxic chemicals.
It may be that in the future the problem of pesticide poisoning will be resolved not because we suddenly become concerned
with a non-taxpaying, non-voting, non-English speaking minority,
but because as evidence filters in that our chemical gardening tools
are winding their way into our food, water, and air, we will finally
decide that we would like to learn their effect as they wind their
way into us. For the present we may choose to remain blissfully
ignorant of our fellow human beings who are delivering our
bounty at an untold expense. Eventually, however, it will be in
our economic and social interest to expend our resources and examine the basis of our cornucopia.
Nevertheless, those who are suffering now should not have to
wait.

